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Jacobs: Supreme Court Tips Against Individual Rights-Again

ARTICLES
SUPREME COURT TIPS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS-AGAIN
Roger B. Jacobs*

I. INTRODUCTION

The employment landscape is still shaking from the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett ("Penn Plaza").'
In a split decision that already has Congress attempting to modify its
holding, the Court continued its expansion of favoring arbitral rights in
the employment context. 2 The 5-4 majority opinion, written by Justice
Clarence Thomas, found that collective bargaining agreements ("CBA")
could compel all union members to arbitrate claims of discrimination
under a CBA.3

* Member of New Jersey, New York and District of Columbia Bars. Managing Partner at Jacobs
Rosenberg, LLC in Newark, New Jersey. Roger Jacobs is also the author of LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT IN NEW JERSEY (2d ed. 2000); LEGAL COMPLIANCE GUIDE TO PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT (Prentice Hall 1993); THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK KIT (2d ed. 1998); DEFENDING A
HANDICAP/DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CASE, DEALING WITH ISSUES OF ACCOMMODATION
(Lawyers Coop. Publ'g 1994). He is a graduate of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at
Cornell University (B.S., 1973) and the New York University School of Law (J.D., 1976; LL.M. in
Labor Law, 1979). Roger Jacobs would like to thank Joshua S. Greeley, Rutgers School of Law 2010,
for his assistance in developing the initial thesis and outline for this article.
1. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
2. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 931, 111 th Cong. § 3(a) (2009). The Senate bill introduced
after Penn Plaza, while containing a general exclusion from the Federal Arbitration Act for
collective bargaining agreement arbitration provisions, also adds that "no such arbitration provision
shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial enforcement of a right
arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United States, a State constitution, or a Federal
or State statute, or public policy arising therefrom." Id. In introducing the Senate bill, Senator Russ
Feingold (D-Wis) specifically noted his intent to reverse the holding in Penn Plaza. Ill CONG.
REC. S4897-98 (2009). Press Release, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold Introduces Consumer
Justice Legislation (April 29, 2009), http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=312222.
3. See Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1474.
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The Penn Plaza decision probably raises more questions than it
resolves. At face value it presents employers with a solution to
employment litigation debacles. All that is required are expansive and
specific arbitration provisions and "explicit" waivers in the CBA.4
However, the dilemma for employers and unions alike is how to craft
explicit waivers that adequately protect all members of the union and
permit the employer and labor organizations to move forward without
jeopardizing individual rights and duty of fair representation ("DFR")
claims at the same time. Similarly, individuals and minorities (both
political and statutory) may find their rights vanquished by union
political machines. 6
In other words, the dilemma facing labor organizations in a postPenn Plaza world is how to represent both individual and majority
interests as well as how to protect the union and its leadership from
breach of DFR claims brought on by a failure to arbitrate every single
grievance through arbitration.7
This article will deal with the historical antecedents leading up to
Penn Plaza; it will attempt to dissect and then to analyze the effect of
Penn Plaza on individual rights under the National Labor Relations Act,
particularly with regard to section 9 principles of exclusive
representation. It will also examine the reactions of federal district
courts to Penn Plaza and then look to its implications for defining the
"knowing and explicit" waiver required by the Supreme Court to qualify

4. See id. at 1465 (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998)).
5. See generally ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 59-68 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans.,

Batoche Books 2001) (1911). The principles enunciated by Michels suggest that union leadership
will respond to opposition in one of two ways: (1) co-opting dissidents into the leadership group; or
(2) crushing the dissidents to maintain their own power. See id. Michels discussed the oligarchical
tendencies of modem democracy and those principles applied to unions as political organizations.
See id.; see also Roger B. Jacobs, The Duty of Fair Representation: Minorities, Dissidents and
Exclusive Representation, 59 B.U. L. REv. 857, 886 n.188 (1979) ("By its very nature, the union is a
political institution and its leaders are basically politicians. Applying Michel's comments, by
analogy, union leaders will do all that is possible to inhibit their loss of power to dissident groups.").
6. Jacobs, supra note 5, at 886-87.
7. The Penn Plaza court did not consider the financial implications to labor organizations of
even bringing matters to arbitration. See generally Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct at 1456-74 (containing no
consideration of financial implications). The typical CBA, for example, has a multi-step process
where the fourth or fifth step is binding arbitration. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 n.3 (1966)
(describing a CBA where arbitration is available after step four). There is a cost to arbitrate even a
simple claim. Gary Grenly, Weigh Cost of Arbitration as Carefully as Cost of a Trial, PORTLAND
BUS.
J.,
Sept.
26,
2008,
available
at
http://portland.bizjoumals.comlportlandlstories/2008/09/29/focus7.htm.
Thus, the question for
labor organizations will be whether they are obligated to arbitrate every single claim in order to
effectively represent members and to concomitantly effectively deal with potential DFR claims.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss2/1

2

Jacobs: Supreme Court Tips Against Individual Rights-Again

2010]

SUPREME COURT TIPS AGAINST

under the majority's opinion.
A. Exclusivity Principleof Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") entrusts labor
organizations with tremendous, almost unfettered, authority. Section
9(a) of the NLRA states that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided,That any individual employee or
a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the

bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at
such adjustment.8
In other words, a labor organization selected by a majority of
individuals voting is the exclusive representative of all of the employees
in a particular bargaining unit whether or not they supported the labor
organization. 9
Labor organizations are invested with enormous power under the
NLRA. The notion of exclusive representation has few limitations other
than internal political ones based upon the democratic nature of the
union, or its failure to properly represent employees.°

8. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
9. A "labor organization" is defined in section 2(5) of the NLRA as "any organization of any
kind or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." Id. §
152(5). The very notion of a labor organization is the subject of separate and complicated study
beginning with the Supreme Court's analysis in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1958)
and its progeny leading up to Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989) and the
Seventh Circuit's reinterpretation a few years later in Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148
(7th Cir. 1994).
10. The Supreme Court enunciated the idea of a DFR by labor organizations in Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) and a series of later cases. See, e.g., Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct at 1473;
Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 49 (1998).
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B. Summary of Penn Plaza Holding
In Penn Plaza, the Supreme Court held that "a collective-

bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union
members to arbitrate Age Discrimination in Emploment Act ("ADEA")
claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law."'1 Employers may have
a basis to dismiss a claim on the grounds that it must be grieved and
arbitrated as part of the CBA. 2 While this result may limit individual
autonomy with respect to the choice of judicial forum, 3 labor
organizations, under the authority granted by NLRA, have the ability to

act as the exclusive representative of the employees with regard to the
CBA. 1 4 Thus, the question becomes what are the practical implications

of such an agreement for both employers and unions in light of the
Court's current analysis in Penn Plaza?
C. Congress' Reaction
Legislation has already been proposed in the Senate that seeks to
reverse the ruling of the Supreme Court. 5 The Arbitration Fairness Act
seeks to empower employees who lack equal bargaining power with
large employers and are subsequently forced into agreements that
include mandatory arbitration clauses.16
Based upon my analysis, the reasoning behind this legislation is
misguided. The holding of Penn Plaza dealt with a collective agreement
reached by an employer and a large labor organization, not an employer
and an individual employee.17
Thus, any suggestion of uneven
bargaining power, at least in this scenario, is misplaced.

11.
12.
13.

Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1474.
See id.
Id. at 1464 n.5 ("The right to a judicial forum is not the nonwaivable 'substantive' right
protected by the ADEA.").
14. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) ("Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .... ).
15. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009) ("[N]o such arbitration
provision shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial enforcement of a
right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United States, a State constitution, or a
Federal or State statute, or public policy arising therefrom.").
16. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold Introduces Consumer Justice
Legislation (April 29, 2009), http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=312222.
17. Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct at 1461-62.
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D. The Dilemma

Labor organizations owe a statutory DFR to members of the
bargaining unit when seeking to pursue arbitration.18 Is that "duty"
enough to ensure minority rights?

What other safeguards should be

taken to ensure that the rights of minority members are not subsumed
unfairly to the will of the majority?
E. Sanctity of or Preferencefor Arbitration

Arbitration has long held a vaunted status in labor relations as the
preeminent tool to resolve employment disputes.' 9 Beginning with the
Steelworkers Trilogy, our national labor policy has favored arbitration as

a principal means of adjudicating contractual disputes. 20 The Supreme
Court's preference for arbitration presumes expertise by the arbitrator to
resolve workplace disputes rather than the need to impose standards
from external sources including the courts. 21

II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION

A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Lays the Groundwork
The initial vehicle for the Supreme Court's post-trilogy
interpretation of arbitral primacy in the area of discrimination in the
workplace was Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,22 a unanimous
opinion authored by Justice Lewis Powell. 23 Gardner-Denveris an oft-

18. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1966) ("A breach of the statutory duty of fair
representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.").
19. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1956) ("[Section 301]
expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these [arbitration] agreements on behalf
of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.").
20. See USW v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1959) (holding that where an
arbitration clause is included in the CBA, questions of interpretation of the agreement are solely for
the arbitrator); USW v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1959) (holding that
whether the employer contracting out work was a violation of the CBA would be decided via
arbitration); USW v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1959) (holding that whether the employer
violated the provision in the CBA that stated it must hire and promote based on seniority would be
decided by arbitration); see also Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 455.
21. See Jacobs, supra note 5, at 884-85; see also Roger B. Jacobs, Confusion Remains Five
Years After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 30 LAB. L.J. 623, 623-24 (1979).
22. 415 U.S. 36 (1973).
23. Id. at 37.
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cited but often misunderstood discussion of arbitral authority with regard
to discrimination claims.
B. The Facts
Plaintiff, Harrell Alexander, Sr., lost at arbitration. 4 Following his
discharge, the Union filed a grievance under the CBA. 25 The CBA
contained a broad arbitration clause.26 Alexander claimed that his
discharge resulted from racial discrimination.27 He had also filed a
claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which was deferred
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").28 After
its investigation, the EEOC found that Alexander's claim lacked
probable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act ("CRA")29 had occurred. 30 Alexander was notified that he
had thirty days to institute an action in federal district court, and he filed
a claim that resulted ultimately in the Supreme Court's review.3 1
The Supreme Court held in Gardner-Denver that an arbitrator's
initial rejection of a statutory claim did not preclude an individual from
pursuing that statutory claim in a judicial forum. 32 While race
discrimination had been mentioned during the arbitration proceeding, it
was not the focus of that case.33 The Court concluded "that a collective
bargaining agreement could not waive covered workers'
rights to a
34
judicial forum for causes of action created by Congress.

24. Id. at 42.
25. Id. at 39.
26. Id.
at 40.
27. Id.
at 42.
28. Id.
29. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
30. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 36.
31. Id. at 43; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (providing that individuals must file a claim
in United States district court within thirty days of issuance of a right to sue letter).
32. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 59-60. The issue presented in Gardner-Denverwas whether
a union employee, who under the terms of the Union's CBA submitted to arbitration, retained the
right to bring a Title VII claim in federal court. Id. at 38; see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. GardnerDenver in the Wake ofGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 593 (1997)
(stating the case originated from a union's challenge to an employee discharge).
33. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 42. While the arbitration was pending, the employee sought
relief under Title VII. Id. The employer argued that the lawsuit was barred by the initial election of
remedies, i.e. arbitration. Id. Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed. Id.
34. Pyett v. Pennsylvania Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 91 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing GardnerDenver,415 U.S. at 49-51).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss2/1

6

Jacobs: Supreme Court Tips Against Individual Rights-Again

2010]

SUPREME COURT TIPS AGAINST

C. Election of Remedies
35
A duality of remedies is a lasting signature of Gardner-Denver.
The Court noted that a "union may waive certain statutory rights related

to collective activity ....

However, the Court stated that these were

rights conferred on employees collectively, essentially for the purpose of
bargaining, and "may be exercised or relinquished by the union as
collective-bargaining agent .

.

. .

However, the Supreme Court

declared that Title VII 38"was designed to supplement, rather than
supplant" other remedies.
The Court stated that Title VII stands on "plainly different ground"
than contractual rights because it concerns "not majoritarian processes,
but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities. 39
Significantly, the Gardner-DenverCourt held those rights that Congress
adopted are "absolute" and that "waiver of these rights
would defeat the
40
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.
The Supreme Court held that the submission of a grievance to
arbitration does not "constitute a binding waiver with respect to an
employee's rights under Title VII. '' 4' The Court found that an individual
may waive her rights as part of a voluntary
settlement, but there was no
42
prospective waiver by Mr. Alexander.
Justice Powell did not disagree with the long-accepted notion that
federal courts should defer to the decisions of the arbitrator.4 3 However,
he cautioned that "deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent
with" Congress' intent for "federal courts to exercise final responsibility
for enforcement of Title VII."44 The Court further noted that while the
arbitral process may be well suited to the resolution of contractual
disputes, that same process may be inappropriate for the resolution of
statutory claims.45
35. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 59-60.
36. Id.
at 51.
37. Id.
38. Id.at 48.
39. Id. at 51.
40. Id. Thus, the tension between the Penn Plaza Court and Gardner-Denver.
41. Id. at 52 n.15.
42. Id. at 51-52 & n.15.
43. Id.
at 55-56.
44. Id. at 56.
45. Id.at 56. The conclusion rested upon the role of the arbitrator, "whose task is to
effectuate the intent of parties rather than the requirements of enacted legislation." Id. at 56-57.
Additionally, "the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient,
inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution" is the same process that "makes
arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts."
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At footnote nineteen, the Court also suggested that the notion of
exclusivity, by its nature, elevated majority interests over those of the
individual employee, which "may be subordinated to the collective
interests of all employees in the bargaining unit." 46 The Court further
noted that "harmony of interest between the union and the individual
employee cannot always be presumed, especially where a claim of racial
discrimination is made."' 7
Significantly, the Court also declared that "Congress thought it
necessary to provide Title VII protections 'against unions as well as
employers.' 4 8 Thus, after Gardner-Denver and Penn Plaza it is
difficult to assess the application of majority rule principles on
discrimination claims despite the potential of extensive waiver
recognized by the majority in Penn Plaza.4 9 The Supreme Court ratified
a dual remedy approach that the Penn Plaza Court may have permitted
to be displaced despite the complementary nature of the remedies.50
1. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
In 1991, the Supreme Court issued a decision that "cast a shadow
over the viability of Gardner-Denver as precedent. ' '5' In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,52 the employee, a stockbroker who

claimed that his termination was based on age discrimination, was
required to sign a standardized stock exchange form that would subject
all disputes to mandatory arbitration.53 After filing an EEOC charge,
Gilmer sued in federal court under the ADEA while Interstate moved to

Id. at 58. The Court's controlling principle was soon extended to other statutory claims involving
the Fair Labor Standards Act, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1980),
and a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284
(1983).
46. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 58 n.19.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. It appears that Justice Powell anticipated the continued encroachment on individual rights
by majority rule in Gardner-Denver. The Court stated that "[i]n no event can the submission to
arbitration of a claim under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement
constitute a binding waiver with respect to an employee's rights under Title VII." Id. at 52 n. 15.
50. Id. at 52. The Court cautioned that "a contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration is
not displaced simply because Congress also has provided a statutory right against discrimination.
Both rights have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee."
Id.
51. Barry Winograd, A New Day Dawning or Dark Clouds on the Horizon? The Potential
Impact of the Pyett Case, 59 LABOR L.J. 227,229 (2008).
52. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1990).
53. Id. at 23.
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compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 54 The
Court agreed with Interstate and held that an individual who signed an
agreement to waive
rights to a federal forum could be compelled to
55
arbitrate the claim.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court drew upon past
decisions that expanded the preemptive reach of the FAA.56 Finding that
no bar existed to the "arbitration of statutory claims, the court reasoned
that the FAA's mandate was paramount., 57 To both respond to and
preempt criticism, the Court assured skeptics that "[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than judicial, forum. 58 Furthermore, the Court assured that the
agreement to arbitrate would not undermine the role of the EEOC to
enforce the ADEA because individuals could still file claims with the
EEOC and the EEOC could still investigate those claims.5 9 Finally, the
Court assured that the arbitration agreements do not preclude the EEOC
from bringing forth independent actions.6 °
The Court's analysis of Gardner-Denver, however, was rather
limited. The Court noted that Gilmer and Gardner-Denver did not
involve the same issues of enforceability. 61 The Gilmer Court tried to
distinguish Gardner-Denverand its progeny by observing that GardnerDenver involved a dispute under a CBA, while Gilmer was the result of
non-union arbitration arising under the FAA.62 Essentially, the Court
held that the cases could be distinguished because in Gardner-Denver
the claimants were represented by unions and in Gilmer the claimant
was an individual bound to arbitrate by form agreement. 63
The Court did not opine whether Gardner-Denver survived

54. Id. at 23-24.
55. Id. at 23.
56. Winograd, supra note 51, at 229 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1988); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1982)).
57. Winograd, supra note 51, at 229.
58. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
59. Id. at 28-29.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 35. The Court found that "they involved the quite different issue of whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims.
Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators
were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held
not to preclude subsequent statutory actions." Id.
62. See Winograd, supra note 51, at 230; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
63. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
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Gilmer.64 Some courts, including the Fourth Circuit, held that Gilmer
"substantially undercut" Gardner-Denverand that employees bound by
a collective bargaining agreement may be forced to address their claims
solely through the process of arbitration.65
The Supreme Court declared that "statutory claims may be the
subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA. 66
But the Court noted that not all statutory claims may "be appropriate for
arbitration . ... ,,67 Additionally, the arbitration in Gardner-Denver
occurred in the context of a CBA.6 8
2. Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.
The tension created from Gilmer and subsequent cases was
presented before the Court in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp.69 Wright was an employee covered by a CBA. 70 He brought suit
in federal court alleging that the failure to hire him because of previous
work-related injuries violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA"). 71 The CBA itself had a general clause in the agreement
that required final and binding arbitration for all disputes.72 The
employer argued that Wright's claim should be dismissed for failure to
exhaust his remedies under the arbitration agreement.73
The Court concluded that while there was some tension between its
precedents it "need not reach the question of whether a union could74
essentially negotiate a waiver of an individual's right to go to court.,
Instead, the Court framed the issue as "whether a general arbitration
clause in a collective-bargaining agreement ... requires an employee to

64. See Winograd, supra note 51, at 230.
65. See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880 (4th Cir.
1996). Cf N. Peter Lareau, Supreme Court Upholds BargainingAgreement RequiringArbitration
of Statutory DiscriminationClaims, BENDER'S LABOR & EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN 207, 210 n.14
(May 2009).
66. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
67. Id. Thus, we need to ponder in the post-Penn Plaza world exactly what claims are
appropriate for arbitration and under what circumstances those claims are appropriate for
arbitration?
68. Id. at 35. The Gilmer Court noted the "tension between collective representation and
individual statutory rights," which is a concern of the author and one that is not readily resolved by
DFR claims. Id.
69. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
70. Id. at 72.
71. See id. at 73-75; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
72. UniversalMar., 525 U.S. at 73.
73. See id. at 75.
74. Winograd, supra note 51, at 230.
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use the arbitration procedure for an alleged violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990." 75 The Court's restraint was premised on
two considerations 76:
(1)the presumption favoring arbitration was only applicable if the
underlying rationale-that arbitrators were in a better position to
interpret collective bargaining agreements-was accurate;77 and
(2) whether the parties could draft a CBA that explicitly provided that
an employee is required to pursue statutory claims through
arbitration.
The Court found it unnecessary to address the issue of whether a
union may waive individual rights to a federal forum as part of the
collective bargaining process, and narrowly held that an agreement must
be "clear and unmistakable. 79 In Universal Maritime, the language was
not clear and unmistakable. 0
Universal Maritime posited the idea that the waiver of contractual
as well as statutory rights was, at least, possible. 8' The Court declared
that "[w]e think the same standard applicable to a union-negotiated
waiver of employees' statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of
employment discrimination. 8 2 The Supreme Court suggested that the
specific nature of the waiver was critical and characterized the GardnerDenver waiver as "less-than-explicit." 8 3 Similarly, it found the waiver in
Plan under review not to be a "clear and
the Longshore Seniority
''4
unmistakable waiver.

8

UniversalMar., 525 U.S. at 72.
Winograd, supra note 51, at 230.
77. Lareau, supra note 65, at 211; see Universal Mar., 525 U.S. at 79 (noting that the
presumption favoring arbitration is not applicable because an arbitrator's interpretation of a federal
statute is not presumed to be within the arbitration requirement).
78. See Universal Mar., 525 U.S. at 79 ("[W]e think any CBA requirement to arbitrate [a
statutory claim] must be particularly clear.").
79. Id. at 80.
80. Id. ("[W]e will not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to
waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is 'explicitly stated.' More succinctly, the
waiver must be clear and unmistakable.") (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708
75.
76.

(1982)).
81.

See id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
at 81.
84. Id.
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III. PENN PLAZA V. PYETT

A. Background
One commentator has written that Universal Maritime "left open
the possibility that a properly framed collective bargaining agreement
could foreclose an individual employee from his right to a federal forum
procedures to remedy
and require the employee to resort to contractual
85
claims."
discrimination
statutory
federal
Penn Plaza arises out of a provision within the CBA agreed to by
Local 32BJ that required all employees to submit any employment
86
discrimination claims to binding arbitration as laid out under the CBA.
Petitioner, 14 Penn Plaza LLC, owned and operated office buildings in
New York City.8 7 Respondents worked as night watchmen and in other
similar capacities prior to August 2003.88
In August 2003, with the Union's consent, 14 Penn Plaza hired
Spartan Security, an affiliate of respondents' employer, Temco, to
provide licensed security guards for the lobby and entrance of the
building. 89 Due to the new relationship with Spartan Security,
respondents' lobby services were rendered unnecessary and respondents
were reassigned to cleaning duty. 90 The Union filed grievances on
behalf of the employees challenging their reassignment because it
"violated the CBA's ban on workplace discrimination by reassigning
respondents on account of their age .. ."91 After failing to obtain relief
85. Lareau, supra note 65, at 211.
86. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461 (2009).
§ 30 NO DISCRIMINATION. There shall be no discrimination against any present or
future employee by reason of race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex,
union membership, or any other characteristic protected by law, including, but not
limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York State
Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Code, . .. or any other similar
laws, rules, or regulations. All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedures (Articles V and VI) as the sole and exclusive remedy for
violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon
claims of discrimination.
Id.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
promote

Id.
Id. (Respondents were directly employed by petitioner Temco Service Industries, Inc.).
Id. at 1462.

Id.
Id. The Union also filed claims that the petitioner "violated seniority rules by failing to
one of the respondents to a handyman position; and.., failed to equitably rotate overtime."
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on the workplace discrimination claim, the Union requested arbitration.92
The grievances claimed both contractual and statutory violations.9 3 Prior
to arbitration, the statutory claims were withdrawn and the contractual
claims were eventually denied by the arbitrator. 94 After the Union's
withdrawal of the age-discrimination claim, respondents filed a
complaint with the EEOC and subsequently filed suit against the
District of
petitioner in the United States District Court of the Southern
95
New York after the EEOC issued a right to sue letter.
B. PositionsBefore the Court
The employer, 14 Penn Plaza, claimed that Gilmer and Universal
Maritime should be expanded to create an unequivocal waiver of
statutory rights under a union-negotiated CBA. 96 This approach would
effectively overrule the section of Gardner-Denver that precluded a
waiver of the individual right to a judicial forum for statutory rights.97
The employer's position was consistent with the Supreme Court's
help to resolve the tension
doctrine favoring arbitration and would
98
Gilmer.
and
between Gardner-Denver
The respondents contended that upholding Gardner-Denver
protected individual rights otherwise lost in the union-controlled
arbitration agreement. 99 Respondents also argued they should not be left
with the difficult burden of proving the breach of a DFR. 100 The
respondents claimed that the CBA only gave the Union-and not

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. ("Because it had consented to the contract for new security personnel at 14 Penn Plaza,
the Union believed that it could not legitimately object to respondents' reassignments as
discriminatory.").
95. Id.
96. Brief for the Petitioner at *2, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (2009) (NO. 07581), 2008 WL 3851622.
see also Winograd, supra note 51, at 230.
97. See id. at *1-2;
98. Brief for the Petitioner, supranote 96, at *5.
99. Brief for the Respondents at *15, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (2009)
(No. 07-581), 2008 WL 2774462 ("[The] combination of union control over the process and
inherent conflict of interest with respect to discrimination claims provided the foundation for the
Court's holding that arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement could not preclude an
individual employee's right to bring a lawsuit in court to vindicate a statutory discrimination
claim.").
100. See id. at *38.40. For example, such a claim does not directly target the wrongdoer, the
employer; the employee does not have the full benefit of advantages that come with litigation; the
range of remedies are also limited; and the union is only required not to act "arbitrar[il]y,
discriminator[il]y, or in bad faith." Id. at *40.
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individuals-a right to pursue statutory claims in arbitration. 10'
However, arbitration cannot be compelled when0 2 it fails to permit an
individual from effectively vindicating his rights. 1
C. ProceduralPosture
In June 2006, following Gardner-Denver,the United States District
Court rejected the employer's motion to compel arbitration. 10 3 The court
ruled that CBA arbitration cannot deny an individual the right to bring
forth a suit in a federal forum based upon a statutory prohibition against
discrimination.'0 4 The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's
holding, again relying on Supreme Court and circuit precedent.'0 5 The
Second Circuit tried to reconcile Gardner-Denverwith Gilmer by stating
that "an individual employee would be free to choose compulsory
arbitration under Gilmer, but a labor union could not collectively bargain
for arbitration on behalf of its members."'10 6 The employer appealed to
the United States Supreme Court and certiorari was granted in February
2008.107

D. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Second Circuit and held that unions are free to bargain for mandatory
arbitration of discrimination claims under the ADEA.'0° Relying upon
Gilmer, the Court found no reason to distinguish between agreements
so long as those agreements were
signed by unions or by individuals
"clear and unmistakable."' 1 9 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority," 0

101.

See id. at*40-41.

102.

/d. at *4 1.

103.

Pyett v. Pennsylvania Bldg. Co., No. 04 Civ. 7536, 2006 WL 1520517, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

June 1, 2006).
104. Id. ("[W]e concluded based largely on binding Second Circuit precedent that even a clear
and unmistakable union-negotiated waiver of a right to litigate certain federal and state statutory
claims in a judicial forum is unenforceable.").
105. See Pyett v. Pennsylvania Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second
Circuit also relied on Rogers v. New York University, which held that an arbitration agreement in a

CBA, in which an employee's rights to a federal forum were supposedly waived, was
unenforceable. 220 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir 2000).
106.
107.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (2009).
Pyett v. Pennsylvania Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct.

1223 (2008).
108. Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1472 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 58 n.19 (1980)).
109. Id. at 1463.
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took a multi-step approach to answer the many questions left unresolved
by Court precedent.1 '
Justice Thomas analyzed the NLRA in relation to the employees'
claim that the clause requiring arbitration was not proper because it did
not involve a term or condition of employment, but rather implicated
"individual, non-economic statutory rights." 112 Under the NLRA, the
union is granted broad authority on behalf of its members to collectively
bargain with the employer.' 3 In exercising this broad authority, the
Court reiterated that the Union must bargain in good faith on behalf of
its members." 4 In Penn Plaza, the Union collectively bargained for a
provision that required all discrimination claims to be resolved through
arbitration. 115

Justice Thomas acknowledged and rejected the employees'
argument, and found this freely negotiated term of the agreement was a
condition of employment.16 He opined that courts generally do not
interfere in a bargained-for exchange." 7 Thus, in his analysis, the
provision must be honored as a condition of
CBA's arbitration
8
employment." 1

The next issue addressed by Justice Thomas was whether the
ADEA precluded arbitration.' 19 In Gilmer, the Court explained that
"[a]lthough all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration,
'[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself as evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."' 120 Relying on
Gilmer, the Court found that nothing in the legislative history of the
ADEA precluded arbitration and that arbitration would not undermine
110. The opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Alito. Id. at 1460.
I11. See generally id. at 1460-74.
112. Id.at 1464.
113. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (As permitted by
the statute, employees designate the union as their "exclusive representative[] ... for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment ...").
114. Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1463.
115. Id. at 1464.

116. Id.
117. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 328 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that judicial nullification of a contract "is contrary to what the Court
has recognized as '[olne of [the] fundamental policies' of the National Labor Relations Act'freedom of contract.').
118. Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1465. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
119. Penn Plaza, 129 S.Ct. at 1465; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
120. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1990).
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the ADEA's "remedial and deterrent function."' 21 Justice Thomas
expanded the holding of Gilmer by stating that its interpretation of the
ADEA applied fully to the collective bargaining context. 122 Justice
Thomas also followed Universal Maritime and wrote that an agreement
23
to arbitrate statutory claims must be "explicitly stated."'1
In this
24
obligation.1
that
met
CBA
the
found
instance, the Court
Justice Thomas also wrote that the ADEA's prohibition of
prospective waivers for substantive rights did not apply. 125 Based upon
Gilmer, Justice Thomas found that the right to a judicial forum was not a
substantive right. 26 Therefore, the prospective waiver of a substantive
right was not implicated. 27 Justice Thomas appeared to align this
decision with Gardner-Denver.
128 However, he was critical of Gardner1 29
Denver in a number of areas.
According to Justice Thomas, the CBA's arbitration provision was
fully enforceable under Gardner-Denverand its progeny. 30 He sought a
narrower view of the holding of Gardner-Denver, that a union CBA
cannot preclude an individual from bringing a statutory claim, is not as
broad as the employees suggest. 13 1 He reasoned that the holding in
Gardner-Denverrested on "the narrow ground that the arbitration was
not preclusive because the collective-bargaining agreement did not cover
statutory claims. 132 Through Justice Thomas's prism, arbitration was
not compelled in Gardner-Denversimply because
of the CBA's failure
133
to address the arbitration of Title VII claims.
Justice Thomas suggested that the line of cases flowing from
Gardner-Denver did not expand its holding. 134 Both Barrentine v.

121.
122.

Penn Plaza, 129 S.Ct. at 1465 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-28).
Id. (holding that "[n]othing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of

arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union
representative.").
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1469 (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S, 70, 80 (1998)).
127. See id.; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1990) ("By
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum." (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
128. Penn Plaza, 129 S.Ct. at 1469.
129. See id. at 1469-73.
130. See id. at 1468-69.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 1467.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 1468-69.
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Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.'35 and McDonald v. City of West
Branch136 "hinged on the scope of the collective-bargaining agreement
and the arbitrator's parallel mandate.' ' 137 In both instances the authority
granted to the arbitrator was derived from the arbitration clause and only
extended to contractual claims, not statutory claims.' 38 Those decisions,
Justice Thomas wrote, "involved the quite different issue whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial
resolution of statutory claims."' 139 Because neither the employees nor the
unions agreed to arbitrate the statutory claims, "the arbitration in those
was held not to preclude subsequent statutory
cases understandably
0
actions."'

14

A possible implication of Gardner-Denver was that a required
arbitration of statutory rights would be the same as a waiver of those
rights. 141 Justice Thomas disagreed with that notion and opined that the
Gardner-Denver Court had "confused an agreement to arbitrate those
142
statutory claims with a prospective waiver of the substantive rights.'
Justice Thomas also addressed Gardner-Denver's assumption that
143
arbitrators were not in a position to adjudicate federal statutory claims.
Gardner-Denverviewed arbitration as a forum suited for the resolution
of contractual disputes, but not for the final resolution of statutory
rights.' 44 However, this view of arbitration has changed. 145 Justice
Thomas stated that:
An arbitrator's capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law
extends with equal force to discrimination claims brought under the

135. 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1980) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53
(1980)).
136. 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1983) (citing Barrentine,450 U.S. at 744).
137. Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1468.
138. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-91; Barrentine,450 U.S. at 744.
139. Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1468 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 35 (1990)).
140. Id. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35).
141. See id.; see also text accompanying notes 104-05.
142. Id. at 1469.
143. Id. at 1471 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1980)).
144. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-57. "The 'factfinding process in arbitration' is 'not
equivalent to judicial factfinding' and the 'informality of arbitral procedure ... makes arbitration a
less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts."' Penn Plaza,
129 S. Ct. at 1471 (quoting Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 57-58).
145. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1986) ("[A]rbitral
tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims...
."); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985)
("We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding
will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.").
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ADEA. Moreover, the recognition that arbitration procedures are more
streamlined than federal litigation is not a basis for finding the forum
of arbitration is one of
somehow inadequate; the relative informality 46
the chief reasons that parties select arbitration.1
Justice Thomas disagreed with the notion that allowing unions to
agree to arbitrate statutory claims created a conflict of interest that was
not adequately addressed by other protections, e.g. the DFR. 47 Justice
Thomas stated that while unions certainly must balance the needs and
interests of some employees against the needs and interests of the
workforce as a whole, that "does not justify singling out an arbitration
provision for disfavored treatment."'' 48 Justice Thomas conceded there is
an inherent conflict between different groups within the union, but
reasoned that Congress had accounted for this
problem through the DFR
149
EEOC.
the
with
claims
file
to
and the ability
Justice Thomas addressed a procedural issue raised by the
employees. They contended that the CBA acted as a substantive waiver
of their rights not only because it precluded a federal forum, but because
5°
it also allowed the Union to block the arbitration of claims altogether.
Because this issue required the resolution of certain contested factual
issues and had not been briefed, the question was not addressed by the
Court. 151 The majority stated that the Court was not in a position to
determine whether a CBA can allow a union52to prevent employees from
effectively vindicating their statutory rights. 1
E. Dissents
Justice Stevens, writing for himself, presented a simple and
straightforward dissent: the issue presented in this case had already been
decided to the contrary in Gardner-Denver.153 According to Justice
Stevens, "[n]otwithstanding the absence of change in any relevant
statutory provision, the Court has recently retreated from, and in some
cases reversed, prior decisions based on its changed view of the merits

146. Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1471.
147. Id. at 1472-73.
148. Id. at 1472.
149. See id. at 1473.
150. Id. at 1474.
151. Id.
152. Id. ("Resolution of this question at this juncture would be particularly inappropriate in
light of our hesitation to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of speculation.").
153. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of arbitration."' 54 Due to the lack of intervening legislation,
the Court
55
Gardenr-Denver.'
in
holding
the
by
should be bound
Justice Souter, 156 like Justice Stevens, argued that the Court should
have adhered to the precedent in Gardner-Denver, which was a
"seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees' federal
forum rights."' 57 Although, Gardner-Denverinvolved Title VII claims,
Justice Souter argued that the Title VII analysis was "just as pertinent to
the ADEA [claim] in this case."' 158 Justice Souter ended his analysis
with an interesting observation:
On one level, the majority opinion may have little effect, for it
explicitly reserves the question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial
forum is enforceable when the union controls access to and
presentation of employees' claims in arbitration, which "is usually the
case." But as a treatment of precedent in statutory interpretation, the
majority's opinion cannot be reconciled with the Gardner-Denver
Court's own view of its holding, repeated
59 over the years and generally
understood, and I respectfully dissent.1
IV. MOVING FORWARD FROM PENN PLAZA

A. PracticalEffect of Penn Plaza
If the holding of Penn Plaza is limited to the broad waiver clause in
section 30, Penn Plaza may have very little practical effect. 60 Unions,
and to some extent employers, very seldom demand a clause that
subjects all discrimination claims to arbitration.' 6 1 In such a scenario,
the holding of Penn Plaza may be restricted to only those cases where
employers and unions agree to an arbitration provision that requires the
employee to arbitrate both contractual and statutory claims.
Penn Plaza stands for the notion that ADEA claims may be waived

154. Id. at 1475.
155. Id. at 1476 (stating that "[i]t is for Congress, rather than this Court, to reassess the policy
arguments favoring arbitration and revise the relevant provisions to reflect its views.").
156. Joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.
157. Penn Plaza, 129 S.Ct. at 1477 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Wright v. Universal Mar.
Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998)).
158. Id. at 1478.
159. Id. at 1481 (citations omitted).
160.
161.

LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR FNTHE WORKPLACE 605 n.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2009).
Id.
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through mandatory arbitration clauses.162 However, there does not seem
to be a substantive basis for distinguishing between the ADEA and other
statutory rights provided that the text and legislative history of other
statutes do not expressly exclude claims under the statute from
compulsory arbitration.
In general, the CBA must meet a very high standard for courts to
conclude that individuals have waived their right to a judicial forum.
Specifically, the CBA must do three things:
1) contain an express prohibition against protected characteristics
under federal, state and local laws;
2) specifically name the statute(s); and
3) explicitly
state that all claims are subject solely to the arbitration
16 3
procedure.
The holding of Penn Plaza appears to be rather limited and
factually specific. However, the questions left unanswered leave much
unsettled landscape. This uncertainty will be the legacy of Penn Plaza
and will impact future arbitration agreements.
B. Forum Waiver
Penn Plaza, as discussed above,' 64 distinguished itself from the
earlier holding in Gardner-Denverthat an agreement to submit statutory
claims to arbitration was the equivalent to a waiver of those rights. 165
Justice Thomas was specific in stating that the agreement to arbitrate a
statutory claim 66"waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the
1
first instance."

162. Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1474. (holding "that a collective-bargaining agreement that
clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a
matter of federal law").
163. See id. at 1465, 1468-69, 1474; see also Shipkevich v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 08CV-1008, 2009 WL 1706590, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009) (showing that employers looking to
take advantage of Penn Plaza's holding should draft a tightly written arbitration provision). In
Shipkevich, the court declined to enforce the arbitration clause when it did not state that the anti-

discrimination claims were subject to mandatory arbitration. Shipkevich, 2009 WL 1706590, at *2.
164.
165.

See supra text accompanying notes 109-11, 130-33.
Penn Plaza, 129 S.Ct. at 1469.

166.

Id.
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V. THE POST-PENNPLAZ4 WORLD

In one of the first post-Penn Plaza cases, the federal district court in
Colorado was asked to address the issue of whether an individual who
elected to take his statutory claim to arbitration, pursuant to the CBA,
may then, after losing on his claim, bring forth the same claim in federal
court. 167

Relying heavily on Penn Plaza'sanalysis of the waiver presented in
both Penn Plaza and Gardner-Denver,the district court, in Mathews v.
Denver Newspaper Agency LLP, concluded that the individual waived
68
his right to seek a judicial remedy by voluntarily pursuing arbitration.
The court found that this case was more similar to Penn Plaza than
In0
Gardner-Denver because the CBA covered statutory claims. 169 17
Gardner-Denver, the CBA was limited to contractual claims.
Specifically, the CBA in Mathews gave the arbitrator the authority to
either
decide statutory claims. 17' It also provided that individuals 7may
2
court.'
in
them
pursue
or
arbitrator
an
before
claims
their
take
In many ways Mathews is factually similar to Gardner-Denver. In
both cases the plaintiff had gone before an arbitrator, presented his
claims and lost. However, in Mathews, the court applied the election of
remedies doctrine that the Court, in Gardner-Denver, declined to
follow. 173 The district court found that waiver can be established
through an express statement or through a party's implied conduct. 174 In
Mathews, the employee's choice to pursue arbitration precluded him
175
from relitigating a claim that was subject to a previous final judgment.
Mathews limited Gardner-Denverto only those cases where there
was no express grant of authority to arbitrate statutory issues. 176 Even if
an individual had the option to arbitrate a claim or take the claim to a
judicial forum, once the individual made a decision he was bound by
that election.
Matthews differs slightly from Penn Plaza because waiver was
found in different forms. In Penn Plaza, the issue was whether the
167.
1231776,
168.
169.

Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency LLP, No. 07-cv-02097-WDM-KLM, 2009 WL
at *3 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009).
Id. at *5.
See id.

170.

Id. at *4.

171.

Id. at *4-5.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
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union can waive individuals' rights. 177 In Mathews, the waiver was not
the result of the CBA, but rather the result of the employee's own
decision to take his claim to arbitration. 78 Although the waiver was
found in a different place, it is likely that the waiver of statutory rights
will only occur if it is expressly mentioned in the arbitration agreement
regardless of who makes the ultimate decision to waive that right.
VI. OTHER POST-PENNPLAZA DECISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

At least one court in New Jersey has recently gone back to the "two
bites" approach from the Gardner-Denver progeny. In Township of
Wyckoff v. PBA Local 261,179 the appellate division found that
Groslinger, who had filed a discrimination lawsuit prior to the arbitration
at issue, was not precluded from pursuing her lawsuit.' 80 In other words,
despite the Penn Plaza decision upholding the exclusivity of arbitration
in discrimination cases, the New Jersey Appellate Court held in Wyckoff,
and citing Gardner-Denver,that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has
stated that an individual does not forfeit her private cause of action if she
first pursues her grievance to final arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement, at least in
cases in which arbitration is not mandatory."' 18 1 The appellate court
continued by stating that "the relief sought by Groslinger in her civil
action was largely different from that obtained by arbitration. We see no
reason in these circumstances why parallel pursuit of the two avenues of
recovery should be precluded."' 82
Thus, despite the holding in Penn Plaza, this New Jersey Court was
not constrained from permitting the Gardner-Denvernotion of duality to
continue. Curiously, the court did not mention Penn Plaza, although it
had already been decided, and instead relied upon Gardner-Denver,
perhaps to suggest differences in the arbitration84provision.' 83 Frankly,
the author finds the decision to be a puzzlement.'

177. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461 (2009).
178. Mathews, 2009 WL 1231776, at *2.
179. 976 A.2d 1136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
180. Id. at 1138.
181. Id. at 1144 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1980)).
182. Id.
183. See generally id. at 1136-45.
184. The applicable CBA provided in section 1.01 that "[tihere shall be no discrimination by
the Township or the PBA against Employees on account of race, color, creed, sex or national
origin." Id. at 1140. In its discussion of the substance of the underlying grievance, the appellate
division noted that the "issue of sex discrimination was also necessarily implicated" by the
grievant's submission regarding disparate treatment to the arbitrator. Id. at 1144. In addition,
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A. Shipkevich v. Staten Island University Hospital
In Shipkevich v. Staten Island University Hospital,185 a federal court
in Brooklyn held that post-termination arbitration of claims was not
required despite Penn Plaza.186 Senior District Judge Frederic Block
ruled that the underlying CBA was not sufficiently specific to preclude
arbitration. 87
The plaintiff, Yemelyan Shipkevich, alleged
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the CRA,18 8 the New York
Human Rights Law, 189 and the New York City Human Rights Law. 90
The plaintiff was a Russian-American Jew born in Moldova.191
The defendant Hospital filed dispositive motions seeking dismissal
because the mandatory arbitration provision in the agreement governing
Shipkevich's employment required that he arbitrate claims against the
Hospital, 93among other theories. 192 The court denied all of defendant's
motions.
The Hospital argued that the suit could not proceed because the
parties were bound under the CBA to seek arbitration.1 94 The applicable
provision of the CBA provided that "[n]either the Employer nor the
Union shall discriminate against or in favor of any Employee on account
of race, color, creed, national origin, political belief, sex,
sexual
95
orientation, citizenship status, marital status, disability or age."',
The agreement provided for arbitration. 196 The court noted that
Penn Plaza was decided during the pendency of its consideration of
defendant's motions.' 9' The court opined that the Supreme Court made

contrary to the suggestion of the appellate panel regarding the mandatory nature of arbitration,
Groslinger sought relief from arbitration. Id. In other words, rather than being compelled to
arbitrate her claims in a mandatory arbitration context, Officer Groslinger sought to arbitrate her
claims and included claims under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-1-10:5-42 (West 1993), in her filing. All of these facts make the Court's conclusion and
omission of Penn Plaza a curiosity.
185. No. 08-CV-1008, 2009 WL 1706590 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009).
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id.
188. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-I 7 (2006).
189. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (Consol. 2009).
190. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101-8-131 (2006); see also Shipkevich, 2009 WL 1706590, at
*1.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Shipkevich, 2009 WL 1706590, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at *1-2.
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1' 98

clear in Penn Plaza that "the content of the CBA is determinative."

The Supreme Court also noted that anti-discrimination exclusions had to
be "explicitly stated" in the CBA.1 99
Contrary to the Hospital's argument, Judge Block ruled that the

CBA "does not mandate arbitration of Shipkevich's claims because it
does not 'clearly and unmistakably require[]' arbitration of statutory
anti-discrimination claims. ,,200
The court continued with its analysis, tracking the original
discussion in Gardner-Denveras follows:
Nowhere in the CBA is there an explicit statement that such claims are
subject to mandatory arbitration. On the contrary, the CBA here is
more similar to the one at issue in GardnerDenver than the one in 14
Penn Plaza: The CBA in Gardner Denver prohibited discrimination

with a list of protected characteristics and did not mention any statutes.
It contained a broad definition of the events that could trigger the
grievance procedure, and provided that disputes not settled by the
grievance procedure "may be referred to arbitration." Despite this
broad language, GardnerDenver held, as explained in 14 Penn Plaza,

did not mandate arbitration
that the "collective-bargaining agreement
20 1
of statutory antidiscrimination claims."

The district court concluded that "Penn Plaza requires the same
does not require arbitration of
result in the present case: the CBA
'
202
Shipkevich 's discriminationclaims.

B. Catrino v. Town of Ocean City
In Catrino v. Town of Ocean City,20 3 a district court in Maryland,

198. See ld. at *2.
199. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465 (2009).
200. Shipkevich, 2009 WL 1706590, at *2.
201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. Id. (emphasis added). The court also reviewed and rejected each of the other claims of
defendants. Id. at *1. Defendant Aramark asserted it was never Shipkevich's employer and could
not be liable under Title VII or the discrimination provisions of New York State or City law. Id. at
*2. The court found otherwise, holding that an "employer" has been construed liberally under Title
VII and does not require a direct employer/employee relationship. Id. at *3. Minimally, Shipkevich
alleged that three of his direct supervisors were Aramark employees; that one controlled his
overtime and that he was terminated because of his refusal to do something he was asked to do. Id.
While some of the factors used to determine employment status are incomplete, the court concluded
there were factual disputes precluding dismissal. Id. Similarly, the New York Whistleblower claim
did not bar continuation of the discrimination claim and the arguments regarding labor law and
other federal pre-emption were rejected. See generally id. at *3-6.
203. No. WMN-09-505, 2009 WL 2151205 (D. Md. July 14, 2009), vacated, 2009 U.S. Dist.
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relying on Gardner-Denverand citing
Penn Plaza, found the applicable
20 4
provision of the CBA not explicit.
Plaintiff had brought a claim under the ADA.20 5 He had been
employed by Ocean City as a police officer beginning in 1994.206 In
February 2007, he informed defendant that he suffered from diabetes
and requested an accommodation regarding meal breaks.20 7 He was
accommodated until July 21, 2007.208 Due to his condition, plaintiff left
his post to go home to attend to his medical condition, i.e. eat a meal,
and was considered to have voluntarily separated from employment.20 9
Plaintiff filed a grievance pursuant to the CBA between the Ocean
City Lodge No. 10, Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP"), and the Town of
Ocean City. 2 10 The applicable provision of the CBA stated that:
[A]ny "dispute concerning the application or interpretation of the terms
of this Agreement or a claimed violation, misrepresentation or
misapplication of the rules or regulations of the Mayor and City
Council of Ocean City, Maryland, municipal corporation, or the
employer affecting the terms and conditions of employment" is to be
settled under the grievance and arbitration process set forth in the
CBA. CBA Article 6. This provision also states2 that
11 the "arbitrator's
decision shall be final and binding on all parties.
Plaintiff Catrino lost at arbitration and filed an appeal under
Maryland law.21 2 Plaintiff also brought the current action in United
States District Court asserting a violation of the ADA.2 13 Defendant
sought its dismissal contending, among other things, that the antidiscrimination language in the "CBA constituted a waiver of Plaintiff's
right to proceed with an ADA claim in federal court. 21 4 Article 5 of the
CBA provided as follows:
The provisions of this Agreement shall be applied equally to all
employees in the bargaining unit for which the FOP is the certified

LEXIS 95599 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2009).
204. See id.at*4.
205. Id.at*1;42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
206. Catrino, 2009 WL 2151205, at *1.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.at*2.
213. Id.
214. Id. at*3.
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representative without discrimination as to age, sex, marital status,
race, creed, color, national origin, political affiliation, disability as
defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or sexual
orientation.215
Defendant relied upon Penn Plaza to urge that the language of
Article 5 combined with the language of Article 6 constituted a "clear
and unmistakable" agreement to arbitrate all anti-discrimination
claims.2 16 The district court rejected defendant's argument, specifically
finding that the CBA did not mandate arbitration of plaintiffs ADA
claim.21 7 The court noted the distinction between submitting contractual
claims to arbitration and statutory, and ruled, based on Penn Plaza, that
"an agreement to arbitrate statutory antidiscrimination claims must be
218
'explicitly stated' in the collective bargaining agreement.,
The Catrino Court found that the CBA did nothing more than
"mandate arbitration of contractual discrimination claims. 219 In Article
5, defendant contractually agreed not to discriminate and, in Article 6,
agreed that should there be an alleged violation, the dispute must be
submitted to arbitration. 220 However, "nowhere in the CBA does it
express or 21imply that claims based on federal statutes must be
2
arbitrated.
The court noted that the ADA is mentioned in Article 5.222
However, it stated that it is "only for the purpose of providing a
shorthand means of defining the term 'disability.' 2 2 3 The court ruled
that the CBA was similar to the CBA in Gardner-Denver,which was
"found to only mandate arbitration of contractual claims. 224 The
CatrinoCourt rejected defendant's argument and reaffirmed the viability
of Gardner-Denver,noting that it "remains good law., 225 It also cited
Penn Plaza affirmatively regarding preclusion to suggest affirmative
magic words must be invoked.2 26

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.at *4.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. In other words, the court is suggesting, at least to this author, that specific words and
phrases must be used to abrogate plaintiff's right to proceed in district court on ADA claims.
222. See id. at *3.
223. Id. at *4.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *5. Curiously, while the court did not find plaintiffs ADA claims to be barred by
the arbitrator's decision, it did reject plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim.
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C. St. Aubin v. Unilever HPCNA
Following Penn Plaza, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, in St. Aubin v. Unilever HPC NA, 227 also
ruled that the waiver in the CBA was not "clear., 228 Donald St. Aubin
sued Unilever, his former employer, for violation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act ("FLMA") 229 and sought "to vacate an arbitration
award upholding his discharge., 230 St. Aubin was a member of Local 70336 of the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Alleged Industrial and Service Workers, International Union,
AFL-CIO, CLC.23 ' The Union and Unilever were parties to a CBA.232

St. Aubin was terminated for viewing pornography, in violation of
the company's internet usage policy, and grieved his discharge.23 3 He
argued that he was fired in retaliation for taking permissible FMLA
time.234 St. Aubin claimed that he should not be precluded by a negative
235
arbitral award under the Supreme Court's ruling in Gardner-Denver.
The federal court took an opportunity to clarify its thinking regarding
arbitration and preclusion by stating that "the Supreme Court recently
abrogated the skepticism of arbitration espoused in Gardner-Denverand
its progeny.,37 236 The court specifically reviewed the CBA at issue in
2
Article XI.
The court also noted that the preamble to the CBA stated "the
parties agree to comply with all employment laws, including the
FMLA. ' '238 In St. Aubin, the federal court declared that this provision
did not meet the "clear and unmistakable" requirement to arbitrate
employment discrimination claims prescribed in Penn Plaza.2 39
Amplifying its interpretation of the Supreme Court's Penn Plaza ruling,

227. No. 09 C 1874, 2009 WL 1871679 (N.D. I11.
June 26, 2009).
228. Id. at *5.
229. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1993).
230. St. Aubin, 2009 WL 1871679, at *1.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at *2.
236. Id. at *3 (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (2009)).
237. Id. at *4. Article X1 provided as follows: "[g]rievances within the meaning of the
grievance procedure and of this arbitration clause shall consist only of disputes about the
interpretation or application of particular clauses of this Agreement and about alleged violations of
the Agreement. The arbitrator shall have no power to add to, or subtract from, or modify any of the
terms of this Agreement .... Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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the district court wrote:
The anti-discrimination clause is part of the CBA's preamble; it does
not refer to arbitration. The CBA requires arbitration "only" of
disputes about the interpretation or application of the CBA's
provisions and violations of the CBA. The arbitration clause does not
refer to the anti-discrimination provision. Unilever does not meet its
the arbitration award precludes Count I for
burden of establishing
240
retaliation.
FMLA
Thus, St. Aubin suggests some defining uniformity by the district
courts that "clear and unmistakable" means just that-an explicit
reference to and recitation of submission of specific discrimination
claims that will be precluded from further review and must be submitted
to binding arbitration as a result of a CBA.
D. Borrero v. Ruppert Housing Co.
In Borrero v. Ruppert Housing Co.,241 Senior District Judge Harold
Baer, Jr., followed an earlier interpretation of Penn Plaza in Kravar v.
Triangle Services, Inc.242 and concluded that the underlying claims by
Leo Borrero must be arbitrated.243 Plaintiff Borrero, pro se, asserted
claims of discrimination against his former employer. 2" Judge Baer
concluded that Borrero was required to arbitrate his claims: "the terms
and conditions of his employment were governed by a [contract]
between the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ, AFLCIO (the Union) and the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations
(RAB) to which Defendant [wa]s a party. 2 45
Borrero "assert[ed] claims of national origin and disability
discrimination against Ruppert Housing. 246
The CBA expressly
prohibited such discrimination in a clause that was "materially

240. Id. Unilever also argued that "St. Aubin's voluntary submission of the facts underlying
his FMLA retaliation claim to the arbitrator" and introduction of evidence constituted his
"agreement to arbitrate the statutory claim." Id. The court did not consider this argument on a
preliminary motion. Id.
241. No. 08 CV 5869(HB), 2009 WL 1748060 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009).
242. No. l:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 1392595 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009).
243. Borrero,2009 WL 1748060, at *1.
244. Id. Part of the difficulty may be, as the court noted, that plaintiff's complaint was "a truly
bare-bones affair." Id. at n.3.
245. Id. Borrero also had a parallel suit pending in federal court regarding the Union's DFR.
See id. at *1 n.4.
246. Id.
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indistinguishable from that at issue here., 2 47 Judge Baer ruled that the
CBA "unambiguously" required Borrero to arbitrate his claims.2 48 The
court directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.2 49
However, in dismissing the complaint without prejudice Judge Baer
noted that "if Borrero is prevented by the Union from arbitrating his
claims, the CBA's arbitration provision will not be enforceable. 2 50
Thus, the Kravar conundrum emerges and gains strength by suggesting
to Local 32BJ that it must proceed to arbitrate Borrero's claims. 251 The
"mandatory" nature of the arbitration obligation of the union suggested
by Judge Baer is augmented by his comment that "[s]hould Borrero's
attempts to arbitrate his claims be thwarted by the Union, the CBA will
have operated as a 'substantive waiver' of his statutorily created rights
and he will have the right to re-file his claims in federal court. 25 2 At
least two federal courts in New York now seem to be suggesting that
Penn Plaza requires arbitration of all grievances, thereby undermining
253
role of labor organizations relying upon Penn Plaza.
the statutory
Only time will tell.
E. Dunnigan v. City of Peoria
Another Illinois Federal Court recently addressed the post-Penn
Plaza world in Dunniganv. City of Peoria.54 District Judge Michael M.
Mihm adopted the Magistrate's report and recommendations regarding
255
Apparently, an
claims of race discrimination and retaliation.
arbitration had been held regarding plaintiffs primary issues.256 A copy
of the arbitration award and settlement agreement between the parties
247. Id. at *2.
248. See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Plaza forces Judge Baer to
rule that the CBA was unambiguous).
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. See id. at *3 (concluding that the Union must arbitrate Borrero's claim) (citing Kravar v.
Triangle Servs., Inc., No. l:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 1392595, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009)).
However, as the majority representative, the Union has an obligation to all of its employees to
objectively and lawfully assess the viability of claims. Is Judge Baer suggesting that every claim,
like Borrero's, must be presented to arbitration?
252. Id. at *2.
253. See id. at *3 (holding that Penn Plazacompels that court to order Borrero to arbitrate); see
also Kravar, 2009 WL 1392595, at *1. The only reason that Penn Plaza does not apply in Kravar
is because the case fell "within an exception to the enforceability of a union-negotiated arbitration
agreement ..... Id.
254. No. 09-1064, 2009 WL 2566958 (C.D. Il. Aug. 14, 2009).
255. Id. at *1.
256. See id. (explaining that a report was filed by a Magistrate Judge who had previously
handled the case).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 1

296

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:267

was attached to the City's submission to the court.25 7 However, the
court noted the City did not address Gardner-Denverand did not submit
the CBA. 258 The plaintiff only submitted the first few pages of that
agreement. 259 Thus, the court ruled that "the City has not demonstrated
that the arbitration proceedings require dismissal of [the] case" on any
grounds.260
Based upon the limited record presented to the court, Magistrate
Judge Byron G. Cudmore found there to be "nothing to suggest that
Plaintiff agreed to submit his Title VII claims to arbitration, or that he
did submit his Title VII claims to arbitration, or that the arbitrator
addressed the Title VII claims. 26' In addition, the court specifically
stated that there was "no mention of the discrimination or retaliation
claim in the arbitrator's findings. 262 The "meaning" of Dunnigan is
unclear since most of the finding appears to be based upon limited
submissions by the parties.
F. Mendez v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc.
More interesting, at least to this author, is the short opinion by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Mendez v.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc.26 3 affirming a decision of
Judge Nicholas Tsoucalas. The court refused to compel Moises Mendez
to arbitrate his employment discrimination claims against Starwood even
though the parties had a one-page letter agreement. 264 The district court
found the agreement between Mendez and Starwood to be unenforceable
because Mendez was a member of a union that had a CBA with
Starwood 65 Mendez was a member of the New York Hotel & Motel
Trades Council, AFL-CIO.266 The Union was designated as the
collective bargaining representative with exclusive authority pursuant to
the NLRA.2 67 Pursuant to the NLRA, only the union may contract the
terms and conditions of employment on behalf of its members. 268 The

257. Id. at *2.
258.

Id. at *3.

259. Id.
260. Id.
261.

Id. n.4.

262. Id.
263.
264.

186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3359 (2d Cir. 2009).
See id. at 3360.

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
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court declared that the "[r]epresented employees are bound by these
negotiated terms and conditions
of employment, which are mandatory
269
bargaining.
of
subjects
The court concluded that "an agreement to arbitrate employment
disputes [wa]s among the terms and conditions of employment over
which a designated bargaining representative ha[d] exclusive . . .
authority. '270 Therefore, the court ruled that "only Mendez's union had
the authority to negotiate such an arbitration agreement and the
provision in the individual letter-agreement27
between Starwood and
' 1
Mendez is an unenforceable 'side agreement. '
The court noted that the individual agreement was not limited to
statutory claims but to "any disputes with respect to [Mendez's]
employment. 272 Significantly, the Second Circuit opined that "Penn
Plaza confirms that a union designated under [section] 159(a) has
exclusive authority to negotiate agreements to arbitrate statutory
discrimination claims. Nothing in Penn Plaza gives an 273
employer the
right to do so outside of the collective-bargaining context.
In Mendez, the court of appeals leaves us to conclude that
individual agreements, where unions are duly recognized, are
unacceptable. In addition, the terms and conditions of the arbitration
agreement, as discussed in other decisions, must be "explicit."
VII. MAJORITY RULE

AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

The Supreme Court, in reaching a decision in Penn Plaza, rejected
the long-standing concern from Gardner-Denver about the conflict
between basic majoritarian principles and the protection of individual
rights. 274 This departure from Gardner-Denverwas not unprecedented
or contrary to previous Supreme Court decisions regarding the inherent
conflict between these two groups. 75
269. Id. (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Michael Z. Green, Divided Supreme Court Allows Union Waiver of Judicial Forum, 37
A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 1 (2009); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
51 (1973) ("Certain collective rights such as the right to strike are conferred on employees
collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished by
the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union members. Title VII,
on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an
individual's right to equal employment opportunities.").
275. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975)

(discussing the principles of the majority rule and the protection of individual rights within the
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In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization,276 the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n establishing a
regime of majority rule, Congress sought to secure to all members of the
unit the benefits of their collective strength and bargaining power, in full
awareness that the superior strength of some individuals or groups might
be subordinated to the interests of the majority. 2 77
Emporium-Capwell represented the "inevitable clash among
conflicting forces of exclusive representation, minority demands, and the
duty of fair representation. ' 278 The Court's opinion in EmporiumCapwell demonstrated a preference for the resolution of nonmajoritarian
problems through the CBA's contractual or statutory schemes.279
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall cautioned against allowing
individuals or minority groups to interfere with the rights bargained for
by the majority 8 ° Penn Plaza did not directly address the issue of the
interference of individual rights with the concept of majority rule, but in
dicta suggested that Congress had already provided for protection of
minority rights in the form of the DFR and the ability to bring forth
claims under the EEOC.2 81 While not directly stating it, the holding of
Penn Plaza is in line with the principle of majority rule that is central to
the NLRA.2 82

However, tied in with the Court's dismissal of the conflict between
majoritarian and individual rights, is the failure of the Court to address
the fact that the "union could contractually waive individual employee
rights to court access and then ...

decide not to pursue such a claim in

arbitration within the limits of its duty of fair representation under the
NLRA. 283
Coincidentally, Justice Souter noted that the holding in Penn Plaza

minority); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1966) (discussing the protection of individual rights
with regards to the statutory scheme protecting the majoritarian principle).
276. 420 U.S. 50(1975).
277. Id. at 62.
278. Jacobs, supra note 5, at 866.
279. See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 73 (holding that the NLRA did not protect activity by
minority employees and followed that statutory construction of exclusive representation).
280. Id. at 70 ("[W]hile a union cannot lawfully bargain for the establishment or continuation
of discriminatory practices, it has a legitimate interest in presenting a united front on this as on other
issues and in not seeing its strength dissipated and its stature denigrated by subgroups within the
unit separately pursuing what they see as separate interests.") (citations omitted).
281. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1473 (2009).
282. See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62; see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (standing for
the principle that unions are free to negotiate based on democratic and majoritarian principles for a
CBA that will benefit the union members as a whole and not necessarily each union member
individually).
283. See Green, supra note 274, at 1I.
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"may have little effect" because the Court failed to answer the question
of enforceability when the union controls both access to and presentation
of an individual employee's claim in arbitration.284 Although in
Emporium Capwell Justice Douglas conceded that employees may
reasonably be expected to approach the union first and exhaust
contractual remedies, he cautioned that minority employees "should not
be under continued inhibition when it becomes apparent that the union
response is inadequate. ' 85 Based upon Penn Plaza, if the union has the
ability to waive an individual's forum rights, it essentially has the ability
to waive the enforcement of individual statutory claims.
Perhaps the place to start our discussion is Justice Thurgood
Marshall's own words in Emporium Capwell, where he wrote:
Section 7 affirmatively guarantees employees the most basic rights of
industrial self-determination, "the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection," as well as the right to refrain from these activities.
These are, for the most part, collective rights, rights to act in concert

with one's fellow employees; they are protected not for their own sake
but as an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing
the practice and procedure of
industrial strife "by ' 2encouraging
86
collective bargaining. "

The majority then stated the central premise underlying the rights of
the labor organization sanctioned by the NLRA and the Congress:

Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining, where the
employees elect that course, is the principle of majority rule. If the
majority of a unit chooses union representation, the NLRA permits it
to bargain with its employer to make union membership a condition of
employment, thereby imposing its choice upon the minority. In
establishing a regime of majority rule, Congress sought to secure to all
members of the unit the benefits of their collective strength and
bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some
individuals or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the
majority. As a result, "[t]he complete satisfaction of all who are

284. Penn Plaza, 129 S.Ct. at 1481 (Souter, J., dissenting). For this reason, Justice Douglas
referred to minority parties in Emporium Capwell as "prisoners of the Union." Emporium Capwell,
420 U.S. at 73 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
285. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 76 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 61-62 (citations omitted).
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287
represented is hardly to be expected."

Justice Marshall also recognized the danger in majority rule when
he noted that "Congress did not, of course, authorize a tyranny of the
majority over minority interests. ' 288 He discussed unit appropriateness
as one modifier of power.289 He also talked about guarantees in the
Landrum-Griffin amendments aimed at democratization of unions as
political institutions. 290 Finally, he commented on the DFR and the
obligation of the exclusive bargaining representative to "fairly and in
good faith ... represent the interests of minorities within the unit. 291

More significantly, Justice Marshall discussed at length the
underlying notion in Emporium Capwell that minority interests in the
Union sought distinctive protections "free from the constraints of the
exclusivity principle of [section] 9(a)." 292 Significantly, the majority
cited national labor policy that "embodies the principles of
nondiscrimination as a matter of highest priority .... ,,293 The Court
ruled that separate bargaining was not necessary to help eliminate
discrimination and concluded that the grievance procedure was "directed
precisely at determining whether discrimination has occurred. ' 294 Since

arbitral awards are enforceable in court, the Emporium Capwell majority
reasoned that such a process was satisfactory.29 5
Interestingly, the Supreme Court seemed to have a crystal ball
regarding the post-Penn Plaza dilemma for unions and grievants alike.
In footnote eighteen of Emporium Capwell, the Court noted that "[e]ven
if the arbitral decision denies the putative discriminatee's complaint his
access to the processes of Title VII and thereby to the federal courts is
not foreclosed., 296 The Court seemed prescient by declaring that:
The decision by a handful of employees to bypass the grievance
287. Id. at 62 (citations omitted).
288. Id. at 64.
289. See id. (citing Allied Chem. & Alkali Wokers, Local Union No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171 (1971).

290. See id.
291. Id. (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1966)). Justice Marshall noted, for example,
that the NLRB had sanctioned employers that refused to process grievances against racial
discrimination. See id. at 65.
292. Id. The court also noted that this principle was discussed at oral argument. See id. at 65
n.15. It was conceded that this exception might also apply to "any identifiable group of
employees-racial or religious groups, women, etc.-that reasonably believed themselves to be the
object of invidious discrimination by their employer." Id.
293. Id. at 66 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1973)).
294.

Id.

295.
296.

Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 66 n.18 (citing Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 44).
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procedure in favor of attempting to bargain with their employer, by
contrast, may or may not be predicated upon the actual existence of
discrimination. An employer confronted with bargaining demands
from each of several minority groups would not necessary, or even
probably, be able to agree to remedial steps satisfactory to all at
once.
The opinion should be contrasted with the post-Penn Plaza rulings
suggesting that individual agreements regarding arbitrability of all
claims are unacceptable,
particularly in light of NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
2 98
ManufacturingCo.
The Court clearly ruled, in Emporium Capwell, that the protection
of minority rights and the right to be free from racial and other
discrimination in the workplace "cannot be pursued at the expense of the
299
orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA."
Interestingly, the Emporium Capwell Court issued its ruling while
Gardner-Denverwas the law of the land. With a seeming expansion of
arbitral authority from Penn Plaza, the notion of seeking relief from
discrimination in federal court may, unwittingly, now be undermined.
Essentially, the Emporium Capwell Court advised the parties,
litigants, and the nation that whatever the factual merits of the concern
raised in Emporium Capwell, their argument is "properly addressed to
the Congress and not to this Court or the NLRB."300 The Court noted
that the legislation was based upon "consciously made decisions within
the exclusive competence of the Legislature. ' 0 '
The dilemma posited by the post-Penn Plaza world may have been
captured in an earlier analysis when the author wrote that "[t]he strong
federal policy favoring use of the grievance machinery under the
collective bargaining agreement has some obvious and ascertainable
limits. 3 0 2 The author further noted that:

297. Id. at 67.
298. 388 U.S. 175 (1966).
299. Emporium Capwell,420 U.S. at 69.
300. Id. at 73.
301. Id. As many scholars have noted, Justice Douglas dissenting in Emporium Capwell,
raised the clarion call and said that the Court's opinion "makes these Union members-and others
similarly situated-prisoners of the Union." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). He also noted that law
should "facilitate the involvement of unions in the quest for racial equality in employment, but it
should not make the individual a prisoner of the union." Id. at 76. Finally, Justice Douglas
concluded in what may be a call to action contrary to the Penn Plaza majority: "Union conduct can
be oppressive even if not made in bad faith. The inertia of weak-kneed, docile union leadership can
be as devastating to the cause of racial equality as aggressive subversion. Continued submission by
employees to such a regime should not be demanded." Id.
302. Jacobs, supra note 5, at 888.
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Unless a minority employee can justify his demands in terms of
interest to the majority, there is no guarantee that the majority's
representative will respond itself or effectively present the minority's
view to the employer in the grievance process. It appears that only if
the minority can muster sufficient political support to create tensions
felt by the majority will
the representative respond in the interest of
3 3
0
tensions.
these
defusing
Thus, the Emporium Capwell scenario places a great responsibility

on the section 9 representative, who must effectively and fairly represent
all members.

However, in light of Penn Plaza, the main question is

whether every grievance must be taken to arbitration. In other words, if
a majority representative lawfully determines that a grievance is not
meritorious or that pursuing it is not cost-effective for the union, will the
failure of the majority
representative to pursue arbitration be a breach of
30 4
the union's DFR?
VIII. DFR LIMITATIONS
In Penn Plaza, the Supreme Court suggested the DFR was a

sufficient protection for individuals when their rights are not adequately
protected by the union.3 °5

The Court is silent as to whether the same approach shall be taken
when the union acts as the gatekeeper for individual statutory rights.30 6
303. Id. at 889.
304. An earlier three-part solution was posited by this author as follows:
1. Only employees who are union members are required to exhaust their grievance
mechanisms under the agreement in a section 301 suit. Nonunion employees may not be
bound to exhaust contractual or internal union mechanisms in a section 301 suit for
violation of the DFR against their union.
2. Complaints arising under non-section 301, quasi-DRF causes of action do not require
exhaustion of contractual remedies.
3. Complaints based on LMRDA and title VII rights require exhaustion of either union
procedures or administrative procedures, respectively, by clear statutory mandate.
Litigation on behalf of unfairly represented employees in contexts other than section
1985(3) could be more responsive to the realities of the employment situation if the
burden were shifted to the union to prove its response has not been inadequateonce the
plaintiffmade a threshold showing of DFR violation under, for example, section 301.
Id. at 891 (emphasis added).
305. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009). The DFR, as first spelled out
in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., stated that the Union was not granted plenary power "to
sacrifice, for the benefit of its members, rights of the minority of the craft, without imposing on it
any duty to protect the minority." 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944). The burden upon the employee,
however, has increased, with the Court holding that the actions of the Union must be "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1966); see also Emporium
Capwell, 420 U.S. at 73, 74 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
306. The Court in Penn Plaza goes to great lengths to differentiate between the prospective
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When the union is the individual's only avenue for redress to proceed to
arbitration on some, or none, of an individual's statutory claims, there
must be other protections offered to ensure that the individual can pursue
individual statutory rights and remedies. 0 7
The union is a collective body that is in the best position to look out
for the needs of the union members as a whole. The DFR may simply
not be enough to protect individual statutory claims. Even if a union is
not acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith, the individual is
still, in effect, a "prisoner" and prospectively waiving substantive
rights.3 °8
The Supreme Court, in Penn Plaza, expressly declined to answer
the question of the legality of the CBA's waiver of a judicial forum
when the union controls both the access and presentation of an
employee's claim in arbitration.30 9 While the Court has left this issue for
another day,310 at least one court has interpreted Justice Souter's
skepticism in Penn Plaza as a means to invalidate the CBA's arbitration
provision.311
In Kravar, the court was asked to consider an arbitration clause that

waiver of the right to a judicial forum and the substantive right itself, While the Court states that
the CBA only works to waive the ight to a judicial forum, it is silent as to what happens when the
substantive right is effectively waived by the agreement to enter into the CBA. See Penn Plaza, 129
S. Ct. at 1464.
307. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1973) (expressing concerns
about the Union's control over the presentation and extent to which an individual's claims may
come before arbitration).
A further concern is the union's exclusive control over the manner and extent to which
an individual grievance is presented. In arbitration, as in the collective-bargaining
process, the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the collective
interests of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Moreover, harmony of interest
between the union and the individual employee cannot always be presumed .... And a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation may prove difficult to establish. In this
respect, it is noteworthy that Congress thought it necessary to afford the protections of
Title VII against unions as well as employees.
Id. (citations omitted).
308. See Generally Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Duty of Fair Representation Jurisprudential
Reform: The Need to Adjudicate Disputes in Internal Union Review Tribunals and the Forgotten
Remedy of Re-Arbitration, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 517 (2009) (arguing that the DFR does not
work for employees because of the need to satisfy the close-to-impossible burden of proof within a
short statute of limitations does not work for unions because they are often required to file pointless
grievances to avoid costly litigation, and does not work for employers who are often dragged into
the litigation because of their deep pockets).
309. See Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1473-74.
310. Id. at 1474 ("Resolution of this question at this juncture would be particularly
inappropriate in light of our hesitation to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of
speculation.").
311. Kravar v. Triangle Servs., Inc., No. l:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 1392595, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009).
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12
required union members to submit all claims to binding arbitration.
Although the arbitration provision was nearly identical to that in Penn
Plaza, the district court found that it was not enforceable because 3the
13
Union had declined to arbitrate the individual's discrimination claim.
The court found that the Union's refusal to take the claim before an
arbitrator was an impermissible waiver of the individual's substantive
rights.3 14 Because the CBA "operated to preclude [the individual] from
raising her disability[] claim[] in any forum ... the CBA operated as a
waiver over5 [the individual's] substantive rights, and may not be
31
enforced.,
Lower courts may follow the Southern District of New York and
refuse to enforce otherwise enforceable arbitration provisions, at least
according to Penn Plaza, if the union uses the holding of Penn Plaza as
a way to prevent individuals from effectively vindicating their statutory
rights. Kravar creates an exception to Penn Plaza when a waiver is
created because the union, not the employee, controls whether the claim
will go to arbitration. This interpretation would mean that even the most
"clear and unmistakable" mandatory arbitration provision would
preclude arbitration only if the union took the claim to arbitration. Thus,
in this type of situation, the court is looking beyond the DFR to ensure
that the individual's substantive rights are not prospectively waived.
Unlike the approach of the Mathew's Court, where GardnerDenver becomes limited to cases where there is no express grant of
authority to decide statutory question, the approach taken in Kravar may
give renewed life to Gardner-Denver. Kravar requires a forum for
statutory claims even if they are bargained away in the CBA.316

IX. WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT?

Both Mathews and Kravar suggest that questions left unresolved in
Penn Plaza will continue to play out until the Supreme Court rules on
these issues. While Mathews and Kravar interpret different portions of
Penn Plaza,317 the widespread interpretation of the true meaning of Penn
312. Id. at*1.
313. Id. at *3 (holding that thereby an individual is precluded from any avenue of redress for
her claims of discrimination).
314. Id.
315. Id. (using as support the notion in Penn Plaza that if the issue were properly briefed the
court could consider whether the CBA effectively works to prevent individuals from vindicating
their statutory rights).
316. See id. (finding that the CBA operates as a waiver of substantive rights because it
precludes plaintiff's claim from being raised in any forum).
317. Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency, No. 07-cv-02097-WDM-KLM, 2009 WL
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Plaza may lead right back to the Supreme Court. However, Congress
may preempt further decision-making by the Court. The Senate's
version of the Arbitration Fairness Act ("Act") takes the interpretation
out of the hands of the Court. The Act states that "no such arbitration
provision shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to
seek judicial enforcement of a right arising under a provision of the
Constitution of the United States, a State constitution, or a Federal or
State statute, or public policy arising therefrom. 31 8 This version of the
Act would explicitly overrule Penn Plaza and direct courts to permit at
least two bites at the apple. The text of the Act goes right to the heart of
Penn Plaza. It provides that no such agreement may waive an
employee's right to bring a statutory claim in court.3 19
X. ANALYSIS

The problems created by Penn Plaza stem from the union's control
of access to the arbitral forum. While monetary considerations may play
a role in the eventual outcome, the majority of issues that will call for a
definite resolution come from a union's failure to arbitrate within the
current parameters of the DFR. 320 A possible tension could occur if, as
in Gardner-Denver,the employee arbitrated his claim and then decided
to pursue it in the courts. While Mathews held that choosing to take a
claim to arbitration waived the right to then take that claim to the courts,
that holding may also be limited to those situations where the CBA gives
the employee the choice of forum, but then binds that employee to his
choice.321 If there is no such language, the courts may reach the same
result as Gardner-Denverthat the individual is free to pursue statutory
claims in court.
A. The Post-PennPlaza World
Rather than clarifying the rights and responsibilities of parties in
1231776, at *2 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009) (interpreting an individuals waiver of his statutory rights
before the court after voluntarily submitting to arbitration); Kravar, 2009 WL 1392595, at *3
(interpreting the issue left open in both the majority and dissent of what happens when the union
does not move forward with an individual's statutory claim).
318. S.931, 11lth Cong.§3(a) (2009).
319. See id.
320. David L. Gregory & Edward McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory
Claims, and the Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett 40 (St. John's Univ. Sch. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-0174), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1433877.
321. See Mathews, 2009 WL 1231776, at *6.
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CBAs, the Supreme Court has made them murkier. The decision did not
elucidate the obligations of labor organizations leading to arbitration.
Recent post-Penn Plaza federal court decisions suggest confusion has
begun to reign. For example, unions are now facing a near requirement,
evidenced by District Judge Baer in Borrero, to compel every grievance
The very nature of majoritarian
to be taken to arbitration.
representation, albeit a flawed one, compels unions to make economic
and political decisions that are not likely to satisfy every member, or
Judge Baer.
The Court has now elevated personal pique to an actionable right.
It appears that the Court has signaled, and lower courts have urged, that
every grievant has a right to be heard when it is alleged that
discrimination caused the action, e.g. termination or discipline. By its
decision, the Supreme Court has simply moved the forum from the
EEOC, for example, or even the courthouse, to arbitration.
Part of the notion of exclusive representation involves deliberate
decision-making by the labor organization. Instead of placing a greater
burden on unions to process to completion every grievance alleging
discrimination, the courts could have and should have focused on
strengthening remedies for alleged failures to fairly represent. It is
axiomatic that succeeding on DFR claims is difficult. Achieving awards
for DFR claims is hard for plaintiffs. However, the Court could have
suggested a streamlined course of action for individuals who believe
representation has been less than adequate instead of green-lighting
maximum movement to arbitration.
Another aspect of the decision that is equally troubling is its lack of
clarity regarding the waiver of claims. The Court stated that it must be
"explicit" in order for anti-discrimination claims to be forced into the
arbitral forum. The dilemma in determining whether a waiver complies
with that shorthand multiplies itself in larger organizations. The more
attenuated the individual member is from the actual bargaining table, the
more difficult it would appear to be for members to even have
knowledge of what is being placed in the arbitration provision.
Additionally, employers seem to be unnecessarily disadvantaged by
the Court's directive, since employers will obviously share the burden
and ultimate cost when these claims have to be re-processed. The goal
of arbitration itself-to simplify the resolution of workplace problemsis thwarted when employers cannot reasonably rely upon representations
at the table due to fear that individual members or employees will later
emerge clueless regarding the language of anti-discrimination
provisions.
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B. Notions ofExclusivity
This author long ago opined that a modification of the exhaustion
requirement might not be incompatible with the twin goals of national
labor policy: contractual resolution of grievances arising out of the CBA,
and elimination of employment discrimination. 322 In the author's article
published in the Boston University Law Review, the author stated that
"[t]he protection of individual employee's rights, therefore, cannot be
eclipsed by a collective agreement. 32 3 This author explored at length
the notions of majority versus minority concerns in the union, and stated
at that time that "complaints of minority and dissident employees should
not always be required to go through the various union-controlled steps
of the contractual procedures. '324 Thus, this author previously suggested
and now reiterates that an exception to the exhaustion requirement might
be appropriate due to the complicated political nature of the DFR.
Employees seeking relief under the DFR framework must show to a
court that the union's response has been "inadequate. 325 Some facts
emerge from the current state of the law, as well as proposed guidelines:
1. Only employees who are union members are required to exhaust
their grievance mechanisms under the agreement in a section 301 suit.
Nonunion employees may not be bound to exhaust contractual or
internal union mechanisms in a section 301 suit for violation of the
DFR against their union.
2. Complaints arising under non-section 301, quasi-DFR causes of

322. Jacobs, supra note 5, at 889.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 888. The author also noted that:
Dissident unionists present a more difficult problem because of the political nature of
their grievances. Their complaints often raise noncontractual concerns, based upon
method of leadership and abuse of the political power resting in the exclusive
representative. Because these political concerns appear not to belong in the courtroom,
the DFR and quasi-DFR tools must be carefully guarded from misuse and abuse. In
other words, individuals should not be permitted to challenge in court legitimate union
leadership that it could not defeat in an election. Courts must always remain cognizant
of the fact that a labor organization is still an elected democratic institution, ruled by
democratic principles. Although every voice is entitled to be heard, the individual
dissenter in a union will remain a numerical as well as a philosophical minority. The
harm flowing from abuse of union power and the impossibility of achieving redress
through the union are the factors most important to a court contemplating exclusive
representation and an exhaustion exception.
Id. at 889-90 (footnotes omitted).
325. Id. at 890.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

41

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:267

action do not require exhaustion of contractual remedies.
3. Complaints based on LMRDA and title VII rights require
or administrative procedures,
exhaustion of either union procedures 326
respectively, by clear statutory mandate.
The author had previously proposed a bifurcation of the DFR
process as follows:
Issues arising under the collective agreement for breach of the
agreement and the DFR should be recognized under section 301 with
its exhaustion and other requirements. But, alleged breaches of the
DFR based on race, sex, religion, national origin, alienage, handicap,
age, and pro- or anti-union activity should be recognized as quasi-DFR
suits actionable under 42 U.S.C. [sections] 1981 and 1985(3),
exempted 327from the exclusive representation and exhaustion
principles.

However, the vexing problem remains after Penn Plaza of the
utility of arbitration in discrimination cases and the potential obligation
of the union to process every case through to arbitration. Obviously,
when negotiating arbitration clauses, employers, as well as unions,
should seek to be explicit in the list of and inclusion of potential
It is
statutory matters that are to be the subject of arbitration.
conceivable, at least to this author, that unions will now be faced with
the horns of a dilemma: do they absorb the time and expense of
processing every claim through to arbitration to avoid claims of DFR
and potential damages, or do they simply attempt to exclude these claims
from arbitration to save themselves from perhaps a futile exercise and
then place the employer on a circular path with regard to the resolution
of workplace disputes?
Employers will need to require specific, explicit, and enforceable
waivers by labor organizations regarding arbitration provisions.
Arbitration clauses will need to be detailed, including all of the potential
claims that could have arisen in the workplace regarding discrimination
and other matters to be arbitrated. Unions may consider individual
signoff from members to avoid or mitigate possible DFR claims and to
ensure that individual members at least are on notice regarding waiver.
Despite each of these safety valves, courts may still seek to exclude
and preserve a "second bite" for certain individuals who appear to either

326.
327.

Id. at 891.
Id. at 892.
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be particularly aggrieved or who are lacking in specific knowledge, or in
cases where deferral agreements are not adequately explicit. At least in
those circumstances, the modification of the DFR burdens, as previously
discussed, might be appropriate.
328
Mandatory arbitration has proven itself to be a system that works.
Despite its doubters, recent empirical studies as well as learned scholars
have endorsed it as a reasonable, practical, effective, and efficient means
of claims resolution. 329 For example, authors Sherwyn, Estreicher, and
Heise stated in 2005 that "[r]eplacing litigation with an arbitration
system allows such employers and their employees to address issues in a
relatively nonadversarial, low-cost forum., 330 However, the authors
noted that an important element of fairness would be promoted if
"adjudicative costs do not overwhelm the claim resolution process." '33'
Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine also discussed the fees and costs
issue in his Michigan study in 2008. Professor St. Antoine commented
as follows:
The Due Process Protocol required a sharing of the arbitrator's fees by
employer and employee, on the theory that the source of payment
might affect at least the appearance of the arbitrator's neutrality. The
D.C. Circuit's Cole decision repudiated that perception and took the
more practical position that imposing arbitral fees and costs on
employees might block their access to arbitration. Since then the
question has become what, if any, fees and costs can lawfully be
assessed against employees without invalidating the payment
requirement or even the arbitration agreement as a whole. In many
instances, however, this issue never arises. The employer frequently
usually not
bears the entire cost of the arbitration proceedings, though 332
the employee's attorney fees or other representational costs.
In other words, various scholars and practitioners have examined
the practical aspects of arbitration as a problem-solving technique. The
Court has now given its imprimatur to the utilization of arbitration as a
comprehensive remedy. Further work must be done to flush out and
provide for fundamental fairness. Fee sharing and cost issues are
328. See David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path
for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1580-81 (2005) (discussing the benefits of
mandatory arbitration).
329. See id. (describing the study that the authors conducted); see also Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 810-11

(2008).
330. Sherwyn et al., supra note 328, at 1560.
331. Id.
332. St. Antoine, supranote 329, at 807.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

43

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:267

obviously factors. However, it appears to this author that the most
significant result from Penn Plaza may be the requirement or constraint
on unions to bring more and possibly non-meritorious claims through to
binding arbitration. Such a result is contrary to the Congressional intent
of the NLRA, as well as most subsequent rulings, including those on the
role of unions. Modification of the burdens required to establish breach
and vigorous monitoring of such claims may be a simpler
of the DFR
3
answer.

33

333. The concerns raised in Justice Stevens' dissent should remain front and center in any
discussion and resolution of this issue. Justice Stevens expressed great concern regarding the
Court's "retreat" from precedent, including Gardner-Denver. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.
Ct. 1456, 1475 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He also acknowledged the "potential conflict
between the collective interest and the interests of an individual employee seeking to assert his
rights." Id. Justice Stevens stated that moving to a system that permits resolution of all claims,
particularly ADEA in this case, by arbitration should be made by Congress and not the Supreme
Court. Id. Justice Souter followed that line of reasoning and wrote that "[t]he majority evades the
precedent of Gardner-Denveras long as it can simply by ignoring it." Id. at 1478 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). He stated that the majority "misread" Gardner-Denver. Id. at 1479. Justice Souter
also noted, somewhat curiously, that "Congress has unsurprisingly understood Gardner-Denverthe
way we have repeatedly explained it and has operated on the assumption that a CBA cannot waive
employees' rights to a judicial forum to enforce antidiscrimination statutes." Id. at 1481.
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